1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32 | [CONTINUED FROM LIC 9099-C, 1 of 3] According to a reference guide tiled, “Bedsores (Pressure Ulcers),” published by the Mayo Clinic on April 29, 2022, risk factors for bedsores include “immobility,” “incontinence,” and “poor nutrition and hydration,” and “skin becomes more vulnerable with extended exposure to urine and stool.” That facility staff successfully closed R1’s pressure injury suggests they timely attended to R1’s continence care needs, despite R1’s ongoing weight loss.
According to facility internal progress notes (which were corroborated by the hospice agency’s own documentation): Beginning March 5, 2020, R1 appeared weak, their breath was shallow, and they had difficulty opening their eyes. They ate “four bites” of dinner, which they pocketed in their cheek instead of swallowing. Staff alerted the hospice agency. R1 then developed a low-grade fever which broke later that night, after a facility nurse gave them a Tylenol suppository and applied a damp towel to their forehead. On March 6, 2020, R1 displayed facial grimacing, restless arms/legs, and shortness of breath. Consulting with hospice, facility staff gave R1 as-needed morphine, which was effective in helping them relax and breathe. Staff connected R1 to supplemental oxygen, which helped them sleep. R1’s physician wrote an order to discontinue all routine medications since R1 was no longer “eating or tolerating routine meds.” Facility PM shift staff wrote that they checked on R1 every 30 minutes, repositioning them in bed every 2 hours. Facility overnight staff wrote they checked on R1 every hour. R1 stopped responding to voice or touch. On March 7, 2022, hospice initiated “Crisis Care,” meaning their nurse stayed bedside with R1 around-the-clock.
On March 8, 2022, R1’s fever returned, and R1 was transported to the nearest hospital emergency room (ER). According to ER records: R1 arrived “comatose but breathing” with a “weak gag reflex.” R1 received an intravenous (IV) infusion, since they could not drink. Even after being rehydrated and starting antibiotics, R1 experienced no change in alertness, passing away nine hours later. According to ER records, the “primary impression” of R1’s death was “septic shock,” with “secondary impressions” of “severe dehydration, hypernatremia, acute renal failure, myocardial infarction, and pneumonia involving right lung.” Upon learning of R1’s health trajectory since March 5, 2020, the treating ER physician concluded it was natural that R1 arrived dehydrated, and said neither facility nor hospice staff failed R1 in this respect. According to R1’s official death certificate (obtained from the County of San Diego), R1’s immediate cause of death was “cardiac arrest” due to “myocardial infarction” and “occult coronary artery disease.” It also said, “sepsis etiology [is] unclear,” and other contributors were “acute renal failure and hyponatremia.” Based on hospital records and physician testimony, R1 was indeed dehydrated upon arrival to the ER, but this was due to R1’s own inability to drink water starting March 5th, 2020, and not due to staff neglect. [CONTINUED ON LIC 9099-C, 3 of 3] |